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Introduction 
 The Part 119 Air Carriers and Commercial Operators’ maintenance 
programs have three primary objectives, per Advisory Circular (AC) 120-16G. 
All aircraft must be maintained and released to service in an airworthy condition, 
and maintenance must be performed by qualified personnel, with adequate 
equipment in adequate facilities, and in accordance with instructions contained in 
the General Maintenance Manual (GMM) (Federal Aviation Administration, 
2016). Air Carriers and commercial operators can assure the continued 
airworthiness of their fleets by performing scheduled maintenance. Today, the 
scheduled maintenance program is developed through collaboration between the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and foreign regulatory authorities, 
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), and operators, which together form 
the Industry Steering Committee (ISC) (Federal Aviation Administration, 2012). 
This program is developed following the aircraft system or structure analysis, task 
determination, and interval selection procedures established by the original 1980 
Maintenance Steering Group – 3rd Task Force (MSG-3) and its later revisions.  
 From a systems engineering perspective, the aircraft maintenance program 
is a complex adaptive system of systems; systems, structures, zonal, and 
lightning/high-intensity radiated fields subject matter experts create the respective 
subsections of the Maintenance Review Board Report (MRBR) in accordance 
with MSG-3 methodology, but do not necessarily know how the overall program 
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will perform. The ISC represents the stakeholders, and it is through ISC approval 
that changes are made to the system and the system is optimized (Federal 
Aviation Administration, 2012). The baseline scheduled maintenance program is 
created early in the airplane development program as a collaborative effort of the 
ISC, whose members are considered equal constituents; the baseline scheduled 
maintenance program cannot be developed without any one member. The role 
stakeholders also play in system sustainment can be fully appreciated through 
examination of the result of decisions made without them. In the context of the 
scheduled maintenance program, what value does the ISC add  throughout the 
airplane life cycle? How involved do the regulatory authorities, OEMs, and 
operators really need to be? 
Failures to Communicate 
Aloha Airlines Flight 243  
 The Boeing 737-200 was pre-flighted by the first officer in the early 
morning, before several inter-island flights, of April 28, 1988 (Federal Aviation 
Administration, n.d.). The pre-flight inspection did not result in any findings, and 
Aloha Airlines did not require additional inspections between flights (Federal 
Aviation Administration, n.d.). On an afternoon leg from Hilo to Honolulu, when 
the aircraft had reached 24,000 feet, it was subjected to an explosive 
decompression event (Federal Aviation Administration, n.d.). A large portion of 
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the upper fuselage separated from the aircraft; there were eight serious injuries 
and one fatality (Federal Aviation Administration, n.d.). 
 Investigations would later reveal that Aloha Airlines’ heavy maintenance 
check (“D-check”) was performed at 15,000 flight hours, which was earlier than 
Boeing’s recommended interval of 20,000 flight hours (Federal Aviation 
Administration, n.d.). However, Aloha Airlines’ schedule and routes resulted in a 
much quicker accumulation of flight cycles than experienced by the average fleet, 
resulting in earlier fatigue damage and crack potential (Federal Aviation 
Administration, n.d.). Additionally, the D-check was broken down into 52 
overnight light maintenance checks (“B-checks”) (Federal Aviation 
Administration, n.d.). These B-checks prevented maintenance personnel from 
being able to assess the aircraft’s overall condition (Federal Aviation 
Administration, n.d.). Furthermore, indications of corrosion onset were 
determined to be normal wear and tear (Federal Aviation Administration, 1993). 
Aloha Airlines did not seem to have a corrosion program in place, and remedial 
actions were deferred without justification (Federal Aviation Administration, 
1993).  
 This case study is one of the most referenced maintenance-related 
accidents. The FAA (n.d.) stated that Aloha Airlines’ flight cycle accumulation 
rate was not adequately addressed by Aloha Airlines when the airline’s scheduled 
maintenance program was developed and approved by the FAA. This includes 
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both the decision to perform the D-check at 15,000 flight hours, and the decision 
to break it down into numerous B-checks. The ISC provides a forum for operators 
to share information about their operations and preferences for maintenance 
intervals. An operator such as Aloha Airlines would have the ability to spotlight 
an issue like rapid flight cycle accumulation, and with the support of other airlines 
and approval of the regulatory authorities, shape the manufacturer’s 
recommended maintenance program, intervals included. Conversations about and 
comparison of corrosion accumulation with other operators may have prompted 
the airline to take more immediate measures to address corrosion. Unfortunately, 
it took this accident to prompt the creation of the Corrosion Prevention and 
Control Program (CPCP), an element of the scheduled maintenance program 
which is supported by regulatory authorities, OEMs, and operators to this day 
(Federal Aviation Administration, 1993). 
Partnair Flight 394 
 Partnair Flight 394 was a Convair CV-340/580 performing a charter flight 
from Oslo, Norway to Hamburg, Germany on September 8, 1989. An air traffic 
controller in Copenhagen spotted the aircraft making an unexpected turn and 
disappearing from radar. Search and rescue efforts began when the flight crew 
failed to respond to radio calls; the aircraft wreckage was eventually found 
scattered at sea and all five crew members and 50 passengers considered fatally 
injured (The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board Norway, 1993).  
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 The aircraft’s fixed and control tail surfaces exhibited signs of abnormal 
wear and tear, said to be improperly repaired during the last overhaul and 
worsened by the vibration of the auxiliary power unit (APU), which had a 
defective front support that did not meet the manufacturer’s design specifications. 
The investigation also found that aircraft ownership had transferred at least 10 
times since 1953, and the latest maintenance instructions were incomplete and did 
not match aircraft configuration. Specifically, procedures pertaining to the APU 
front support were outdated and erroneous (The Aircraft Accident Investigation 
Board Norway, 1993). 
 Among the recommendations made by The Aircraft Accident 
Investigation Board Norway (AAIB/N) were calls for increased oversight, 
particularly of “aircraft requiring special attention” (The Aircraft Accident 
Investigation Board Norway, 1993, p. 114). This recommendation included a call 
for regulatory authorities to introduce mandatory quality assurance (The Aircraft 
Accident Investigation Board Norway, 1993). Today, regulatory authorities and 
their delegates are highly involved in maintenance oversight and have the final 
approval authority over scheduled maintenance programs and repairs. 
Nigeria Airways Flight 2120 
 Nigerian Airways’ McDonnell Douglas DC-8 experienced failure of the 
left main gear tires and wheels during takeoff from King Abdulaziz International 
Airport in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on July 11, 1991. The burning tires retracted with 
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the landing gear, causing a fire to build in the left main wheel well. The fire led to 
depressurization and loss of control in addition to destroying the hydraulic system 
and airframe. The crew tried to initiate an emergency landing, but the aircraft 
crashed and killed all 14 crew members and 247 passengers on board (Flight 
Safety Foundation, 1993).  
 Maintenance was found to be a contributing factor in this event as well. 
The aircraft was found to be in an unworthy condition; tire pressure was lower 
than the allowable dispatch pressure and had not been checked for several days, 
but the aircraft was signed off as airworthy (Flight Safety Foundation, 1993). 
Interestingly, the investigation report did not include recommendations for the 
maintenance causal factor. The safety-criticality of adequate tire servicing was 
perhaps not well understood by the airline or otherwise communicated by the 
manufacturer, and this event serves as an example of lack of oversight of 
scheduled maintenance that could result in safety hazards.  
Chalk’s Ocean Airways Flight 101 
 Chalk’s Ocean Airways Flight 101 was a Grumman Turbo Mallard (G-
73T) en route from the Miami Seaplane Base to Bimini, Bahamas on December 
19, 2005. The aircraft crashed into a shipping channel off the Port of Miami after 
the right wing departed in flight, killing all 20 passengers (National 
Transportation Safety Board, 2007).  
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Upon investigation, it was revealed that the right rear Z-stringer had likely 
been fractured for years prior to the accident, and this fatigue damage was 
followed by fatigue cracking in the skin, propagating from corrosion at the fuel 
sump drain. The accident report commented on Chalk’s Ocean Airways’ 
maintenance program and its inability to address structural problems; while 
maintenance personnel were able to identify and repair structural issues, those 
repairs did not restore the aircraft to an airworthy condition. Investigation also 
identified corrosion throughout the structure and other cracks which would have 
eventually led to an event had this particular accident not occurred (National 
Transportation Safety Board, 2007).  
 Chalk’s Ocean Airways seemed to have had two big issues: its 
maintenance program failed at addressing the fatigue and corrosion damage 
accumulated by the accident aircraft over time, and organizational culture 
pressured the maintenance department to dispatch aircraft regardless of their 
airworthiness status. This was not helped by the lack of Principle Maintenance 
Inspector (PMI) oversight; a review of paperwork signed by the PMI indicated 
that a major repair to the Z-stringer was undocumented (National Transportation 
Safety Board, 2007). Both the airline and the FAA representative could have been 
more diligent in inspecting the aircraft, documenting findings, and speaking up 
when signs of aircraft aging were noted. Findings that could have been noted by 
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both parties had the maintenance program been more robust could have been 
presented at the industry level and a maintenance optimization activity proposed.  
Discussion 
 Stakeholders are critical to the success of a system at all stages in the 
system’s life cycle. In the problem definition stage, stakeholders provide 
information that defines the scope of the problem and the parameters within 
which the solution must fit (Parnell, Driscoll, & Henderson, 2011). In the context 
of the baseline scheduled maintenance program, the members of the ISC 
collaborate to identify system characteristics that lead to the development of 
scheduled maintenance, discuss whether recommended maintenance is feasible, 
and determine whether the recommended tasks and intervals satisfy system and 
user requirements. This interaction continues to solution implementation, during 
which stakeholders act on the tasks and controls of the solution. For the ISC, this 
entails the regulatory authorities’ approval and oversight of the scheduled 
maintenance program, the OEMs’ production and maintenance of the scheduled 
maintenance program, and the operators’ implementation of and feedback 
concerning the scheduled maintenance program.  
 The longest and most prominent stage of a system’s life cycle is often 
system operation, and this is certainly true when it comes to the aircraft scheduled 
maintenance program. During this stage, stakeholders have several objectives, 
including monitoring and evaluating system performance to plan, identifying 
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operational risks, and looking for opportunities to optimize system performance in 
order to give the user a competitive advantage (Parnell et al., 2011). In this case, 
the monitoring and evaluating of the scheduled maintenance program is done for 
the global fleet by the OEM, and for individual fleets by operators. Through 
monitoring and evaluating, these stakeholders can identify opportunities to 
statistically optimize the scheduled maintenance program at the different levels. 
Both of these parties must be aware of and openly communicate any safety, 
operational, and economic risks inherent in the system, and the regulatory 
authorities must speak up when a safety risk exists. Thus, the constant 
communication and participation of the members of the ISC ensure system 
success long after the system solution, in the form of the baseline scheduled 
maintenance program, is implemented.  
 Each of the accidents previously discussed illustrates the value each 
member of the ISC adds to the airplane life cycle by highlighting what happens 
when the member is not involved. In the Aloha Airlines example, communication 
between the OEM and operator should have revealed concerns about flight cycle 
accumulation and the issues resulting from re-packaging the heavy check and 
collaboration between operators with varying experience would have revealed 
more about the seriousness of corrosion experienced by Aloha Airlines. The 
Partnair and Nigeria Airways examples emphasizes the importance of regulatory 
oversight over airworthiness. Finally, the Chalk’s Ocean Airways accident is an 
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example where all three parties could have been more involved. The three 
members of the ISC balance each other out, holding each other accountable for 
their individual roles in system development, implementation, and operation. 
Through thorough and continuing discussion, these stakeholders can ensure the 
system requirements, plan, risks, and outcomes are understood, and labor toward 
ensuring the system operates at the highest possible level of safety.  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 Parnell et al. (2011) explained the important role systems play in society, 
emphasizing that effective systems provide value to consumers and owners, 
whereas ineffective systems can be detrimental financially and physically. To 
assure the success of a system, stakeholders may opt to employ systems 
engineering best practices, from general systems thinking to detailed solution 
implementation strategies. Systems engineering tools and resources contribute to 
the development and sustainment of effective systems by: 
• Bringing together expertise from various applicable disciplines and 
perspectives, 
• Accounting for the system’s entire life cycle, 
• Facilitating brainstorming of mutually beneficial solution designs, and 
• Using modeling and simulation to narrow down solution design options 
(Parnell et al., 2011). 
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Therefore, it is appropriate to consider the individual members of the ISC systems 
engineers, and the aircraft scheduled maintenance program the system they 
produce and improve. Each member brings with him or her some unique 
knowledge of aircraft systems, maintenance operations, regulatory requirements, 
and aviation safety. The ISC also provides a forum for inexperienced and 
experienced members to collaborate, increasing the overall conglomerate’s 
knowledge of the system’s life cycle (i.e. task selection, task evolution, and task 
retirement). In early stages of the system life cycle, the OEM will likely propose 
changes to the system for consideration by operators and regulatory authorities. 
However, later in the life cycle, the operators and regulatory authorities may 
propose changes as well, in the form of a request for task optimization, 
airworthiness directive, or Issue Paper. In many cases, cost-benefit models are 
helpful in finalizing changes to the system. Will a task be economical? Is there an 
operational impact on the airline if a task is not required? Does performing a task 
ensure operational safety?  
In some cases, the answers to these questions are not obvious to any 
singular member of the ISC. For instance, a failure-finding maintenance task may 
be seen as applicable and effective by the OEM, but economically burdensome by 
the operator. If whether or not a task is required has no bearing on operating 
safety, the ISC may decide no task is necessary at all. The importance of this 
relationship and communication between regulatory authorities, OEM, and 
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operators cannot be stressed enough. As evidenced by the aviation events 
discussed herein, lapses in communication and collaboration have led to what 
Parnell et al. (2011) would consider ineffective systems. However, continuous 
involvement of these stakeholders in the systems engineering life cycle can help 
contribute to more effective systems that benefit everyone.   
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